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Abstract. In this paper, the problem of low probability of 
identification (LPID) improvement for radar network 
systems is investigated. Firstly, the security information is 
derived to evaluate the LPID performance for radar net-
work. Then, without any prior knowledge of hostile inter-
cept receiver, a novel fuzzy chance-constrained program-
ming (FCCP) based security information optimization 
scheme is presented to achieve enhanced LPID perform-
ance in radar network systems, which focuses on minimiz-
ing the achievable mutual information (MI) at interceptor, 
while the attainable MI outage probability at radar net-
work is enforced to be greater than a specified confidence 
level. Regarding to the complexity and uncertainty of elec-
tromagnetic environment in the modern battlefield, the 
trapezoidal fuzzy number is used to describe the threshold 
of achievable MI at radar network based on the credibility 
theory. Finally, the FCCP model is transformed to a crisp 
equivalent form with the property of trapezoidal fuzzy 
number. Numerical simulation results demonstrating the 
performance of the proposed strategy are provided. 
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1. Introduction 
Radar network architecture, which often refers to dis-
tributed multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) radar [1], 
is pioneered by Fisher in [2] and has drawn considerable 
attentions due to its advantage of signal and spatial diversi-
ties. Moreover, radar network outperforms traditional 
monostatic radar in target detection, localization accuracy 
and information extraction [3]. 
Recent years have witnessed an increasing interest on 
the radar network configuration which has been exten-
sively studied from various perspectives. The authors in [4]  
consider the optimal waveform design for MIMO radar in 
colored noise based on maximization of mutual informa-
tion (MI) and relative entropy. Yang and Blum present two 
radar waveform design schemes with constraints on wave-
form power [5]: the one is maximization of the MI between 
the target impulse response and the reflected waveform, the 
other is minimization of the minimum mean-square error 
(MMSE) in estimating the target impulse response. 
A novel two-stage waveform optimization algorithm for 
distributed MIMO radar is proposed in [6], where it is 
demonstrated that this method can provide great perform-
ance improvement in target information extraction. In [7], 
the authors present three power allocation criteria integrat-
ing propagation losses into distributed MIMO radar signal 
model: maximizing the MI, minimizing the MMSE and 
maximizing the echo energy. Shi et al. in [8], [9] investi-
gate the low probability of intercept (LPI) optimization 
strategies in radar network configurations for the first time, 
which are shown to be effective to enhance the LPI per-
formance for radar networks. 
In recent years, pursing high physical-layer (PHY) se-
curity is becoming a central issue in wireless communica-
tions, in which secrecy capacity is utilized as a metric for 
secrecy communication performance [10]. In [11], the 
authors study the use of artificial interference in maximiz-
ing secrecy capacity, where a portion of the transmitting 
power is allocated to broadcast the information signal with 
enough power to guarantee a certain signal-to-interference-
plus-noise ratio (SINR) for the intended receiver, while the 
rest of the power is utilized to broadcast artificial interfer-
ence to jam the passive eavesdroppers. Zhou et al. in [12] 
investigate the problem of secure communication in fading 
channels. While [13] proposes an optimization strategy for 
achieving security over multiple-input single-output 
(MISO) channels by beamforming and artificial interfer-
ence combined with the “protected zone”. Mukherjee and 
Swindlehurst model the interactions between the legitimate 
transmitter and active eavesdropper as a two-person zero-
sum game [14]. The authors in [15] present a multiuser 
scheduling algorithm to improve the cognitive transmission 
security. Further, Wang et al. in [16] propose security  
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information factor to evaluate radar radio frequency (RF) 
stealth, where it is illustrated airborne radar RF stealth 
effects based on security information factor concept under 
some conditions. Shi et al. extend the work in [16] and 
provide a security information based optimal power alloca-
tion scheme for LPID performance in radar networks [17], 
[18].  
However, most researches on secrecy capacity are 
mainly towards maximizing the secrecy rate for communi-
cation with guaranteeing system requirements. The use of 
security information for LPID performance in radar net-
work systems has rarely been studied previously, which 
motivates us to consider this problem. In addition, the 
modern electromagnetic environment is becoming more 
and more complicated, large difficulties for radar mission 
are caused by amounts of uncertain factors in electronic 
warfare, which cannot be completely solved by stochastic 
theory. The theory of fuzzy set has drawn considerable 
attentions since this concept was initiated by Zadeh [19] in 
1965. In 2002, Liu [20] proposed the concept of credibility 
measure, and established the theory of fuzzy chance-con-
strained programming (FCCP) [21], which is a branch of 
mathematics for studying fuzzy phenomena.  
This paper will investigate the FCCP based security 
information optimization for LPID enhancement in radar 
networks. The main contributions of this paper are summa-
rized as follows. Firstly, we derive an analytical closed-
form expression of security information. Secondly, when 
the prior knowledge of intercept receiver is unavailable, 
a novel FCCP based security information optimization 
algorithm is formulated to minimize the achievable MI at 
intercept receiver, while the achievable MI outage prob-
ability at radar network is enforced to be greater than 
a specified confidence level. Regarding to the complexity 
and uncertainty of electromagnetic environment in the 
modern electronic warfare, the trapezoidal fuzzy number is 
utilized to describe the threshold of achievable MI at radar 
network. Finally, the FCCP model is transformed to a crisp 
equivalent form with the property of credibility theory. 
Numerical simulations are provided to demonstrate that our 
proposed algorithm can improve the LPID performance for 
radar networks to defend against passive intercept receiv-
ers. To the best of authors’ knowledge, no literature dis-
cussing FCCP based security information optimization for 
improved LPID performance in radar network systems was 
conducted prior to this work. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 introduces the basic concepts of credibility 
theory and the system model for radar network. We first 
derive the analytical closed-form expression of security 
information with cooperative jamming (CJ) for radar net-
work in Sec. 3 and formulate the FCCP based security 
information optimization algorithm for radar network sys-
tem. Section 4 provides some numerical simulation results. 
Finally, conclusion remarks are drawn in Sec. 5. 
2. Preliminaries and System Model  
2.1 Credibility Theory 
The theory of fuzzy set has received close attention 
by the scientific community over the last several decades, 
which was pioneered by Zadeh via membership function in 
1965. In 1978, Zadeh presented the concept of possibility 
measure, which is utilized to measure a fuzzy set. Although 
possibility measure has been widely used in both theory 
and practice, it has no self-duality property. In 2002, Liu 
proposed the concept of credibility measure to define 
a self-dual measure. After that, Liu established the credibil-
ity theory in 2004, which is a branch of mathematics for 
studying fuzzy phenomena. Some basic concepts of credi-
bility theory are provided in the following. 
Definition 2.1: (Liu & Liu [20]) Let Θ  be a nonempty 
set, and P  the power set of Θ . The set function Cr  is 
called a credibility measure if it satisfies the following four 
axioms: 
Axiom 1:   1Cr Θ  . 
Axiom 2:    Cr A Cr B , whenever A B . 
Axiom 3:     1cCr A Cr A   for any event A P . 
Axiom 4:    supi i i iCr A Cr A   for any events  iA  
with  sup 0.5i iCr A  . 
Then, the triplet  , ,P Cr  is called a credibility space. 
Definition 2.2: (Liu [21]) A fuzzy variable is a measurable 
function from a credibility space  , ,P Cr  to the set of 
real numbers  . 
Definition 2.3: (Liu [21]) Let   be a fuzzy variable de-
fined on the credibility space  , ,P Cr . Then its member-
ship function is derived from the credibility measure by: 
     2 1,x Cr x x      .  (1) 
Theorem 2.1 (Credibility Inversion Theorem): (Liu 
[21]) Let   be a fuzzy variable with membership function 
 x . Then for any set B  of real numbers, we have: 
      1 sup 1 sup
2 cx B x B
Cr B x x  
 
       .  (2) 
Definition 2.4: (Liu [21]) The credibility distribution 
 : 0,1Φ   of a fuzzy variable   is defined by: 
     |Φ x Cr x     .   (3) 
That is,  Φ x  is the credibility that the fuzzy variable   
takes a value less than or equal to x . 
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2.2 Radar Network SNR Equation 
Let us consider a radar network system with Nt trans-
mitters and Nr receivers, which can be broken down into 
Nt  Nr transmitter-receiver pairs each with a bistatic com-
ponent contributing to the entirety of the radar network 
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), as depicted in Fig. 1. The radar 
network system has a common precise knowledge of space 
and time. In addition, it is worth pointing out that orthogo-
nal polyphase codes are utilized in radar network system, 
which have a large main lobe-to-side lobe ratio. These 
codes have a more complicated signal structure making it 
harder to intercept and identify by a noncooperative inter-
cept receiver.  
 
Fig. 1. Example of a radar network. 
The radar network SNR can be calculated by 
summing up the SNR of each transmit-receive pair as in 
[1]: 
  
2
3 2 2
1 1 4
t rN N
tm tm rn tmn m
net
m n omn rm rn tm rn mn
P G G
SNR
kT B F R R L
 
      (4) 
where the Ptm is the m th transmitter power, Gtm is the mth 
transmit antenna gain, Grn is the n th receive antenna gain, 
σtmn is the radar cross section (RCS) of the target for the 
mth transmitter and nth receiver, λm is the m th transmitted 
wavelength, k is Boltzmann’s constant, Tomn is the receiv-
ing system noise temperature at the n th receiver, Brm is the 
bandwidth of the matched filter for the mth transmitted 
waveform, Frn is the noise factor for the nth receiver, Lmn is 
the system loss between the mth transmitter and nth re-
ceiver, Rtm is the distance from the mth transmitter to the 
target and Rrn is the distance from the target to the nth 
receiver. 
2.3 Radar Network Signal Model 
Let K denote the discrete time index, then we can 
express the radar network signal model as: 
 r r rY = XH + W    (5) 
where X = [x1, x2, …, xNt]  K × Nt, is the set of 
transmission sequences, Hr = [hr1, hr2, …, hrNt]  Nt× Nr 
refers to the path gain matrix for radar network system, 
Wr = [wr1, wr2, …, wrNr]  K × Nr represents the system 
noise, and the received signal matrix can be written as 
Yr = [yr1, yr2, …, yrNt]  K × Nr. For convenience, it is as-
sumed that the noise matrix Wr does not depend on the 
transmitted waveform X, and Hr and Wr are mutually 
independent. 
According to the discussions in [7], the path gain hrn  
contains the target reflection coefficient gmn and the pro-
pagation loss factor pmn. Based on the central limit theo-
rem, gmn ~ CN(0, σg2), where gmn denotes the target reflec-
tion gain between the radar m and radar n. The propagation 
loss factor pmn can be expressed as: 
 tm rnmn
tm rn
G G
p
R R
 .  (6) 
Furthermore, with the consideration of propagation 
losses and target scattered matrix, the radar network signal 
model (5) can be rewritten as: 
   r rY X G P W    (7) 
where G = [g1, g2, …, gNr], P = [p1, p2, …, pNr], 
wrn ~ CN(0, σwr2IK), and   denotes the Hadamard product. 
3. Problem Formulation 
3.1 Security Information for Radar Network 
Systems 
With the definition of MI in [17], [18], we can obtain 
the MI between the transmitting signal of radar network 
X  and the backscatter signal rY  as follows:  
 
     
   
 
r r r
r r
X,Y Y Y | X
Y W
ln 1
ln 1
t r
r
t r
r
2 2N N
tm g mn
2
m=1 n=1 w
2N N
tm g tm rn
net r2 2 2
m=1 n=1 w tm rn
P σ p
+ σ
P σ G G
= + I Pσ R R
 
 
     
    

 
I H H
H H
   (8) 
where I(X, Yr) is the MI between Yr and X, H(Yr) is the 
entropy of backscatter signal, and H(Wr) is the entropy of 
Gaussian white noise. 
Similarly, we can express the MI between the trans-
mitting signal of radar network X  and the received signal 
of intercept receiver Yi as: 
 
     
ln
t
i
N
tm tm int
2 2
m=1 w tm
I , = H - H |
P G G
+ σ R
     
i i iX Y Y Y X
1
   (9) 
where Gint is the antenna gain of intercept receiver, σwi2 
denotes the noise covariance of intercept receiver. 
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As introduced in [17], [18], in modern electronic war-
fare, cooperative jammer is indispensable to keep the radar 
network in LPID state. This means that CJ is to jam the 
hostile intercept receiver so that the achievable MI at inter-
ceptor can be degraded by the CJ signals while the radar 
network system is unaffected. With the consideration of 
CJ, we can modify (12) as follows: 
   int int
1 int2 2
2
ln 1 ,
t
i
N
tm tm
r j
m j j
w tm
j
P G G
I , I P P
P G G
R
R

             
 iX Y (10) 
where Pj is the total transmitting power for CJ signal, Gj is 
the antenna gain of cooperative jammer, Rj is the distance 
from the target to cooperative jammer. 
For convenience, we assume that the radar network 
system can simultaneously transmit radar modulating sig-
nal to track target and CJ signal to interfere passive inter-
cept receiver for simplicity of discussion, while the CJ 
signal is designed to be completely orthogonal to radar 
modulating signal and generated to jam the intercept re-
ceiver without affecting the radar network. 
 
Fig. 2. The notional sketch of our proposed perfectly secure 
radar network system. 
For simplicity of derivation, it is supposed that: 
  2 1, , , 1, ,net ti rj t rR R R m N n N     ,   (11) 
  1, ,rtm t
t
PP m N
N
       (12) 
where Rnet is approximately the distance from target to 
radar network system, Pr is the total transmitting power for 
radar modulating signal. It is also assumed that each netted 
radar node in the network is the same. Therefore, originat-
ing from the secrecy capacity in wireless communications, 
we define security information to measure the LPID per-
formance for radar network system [17], [18]: 
 
 
   
sec
int
2
2 4
int
int2 2
2
,
,
ln 1
ln 1
r
i
r j
net r r j
r g t r
t r
t w net
r t
t
j j
t w net
j
I P P
I P I P P
P G G
N N
N R
P G G
N
P G G
N R
R



  
                            


   (13) 
where [x]+ = max (0, x). It has been pointed out in [17], [18] 
that Isec > 0 means that radar network is in completely 
secure state while tracking target, and that the larger the 
achievable security information Isec obtained, the better 
LPID performance to finish the system mission. 
The notional sketch of our proposed perfectly secure 
radar network system is illustrated in Fig. 2. This amounts 
to say that, if the radar network system experiences an 
SNR higher than that of the noncooperative intercept re-
ceiver, a positive rate can be sustained, while the intercept 
receiver gets maximally confused based on the utilized 
secrecy criterion in (13). 
3.2 FCCP Based Security Information 
Optimization 
In practical applications, it would be impossible to 
suppose that any prior information about the hostile inter-
cept receiver is available, such as the sensitivity of inter-
ceptor, the processing gain, et al. The system model is 
illustrated in Fig. 3, where the target and the intercept re-
ceiver are separated at different places. 
 
Fig. 3. The geometry of radar network, target and interceptor. 
With the derivation of security information as (13), 
we can observe that security information is based on satis-
fying MI constraints both at radar network and at intercept 
receiver. With a proper choice of the power allocation, 
a perfectly securing channel can be devised such that: 
 
 
 int , 0j
th
net r
P
r j
I P
I P P

   
   (14) 
where δth is the predefined threshold of MI at radar 
network. Equation (14) means asymptotically perfect 
security in radar network system. 
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In this paper, we focus on minimizing the achievable 
MI at intercept receiver Iint(Pr, Pj) to guarantee a prede-
fined threshold of MI at radar network δth. To be more 
specific, minimization of the achievable MI at noncoopera-
tive intercept receiver can significantly defend against 
interceptor, showing LPID performance enhancement of 
exploiting CJ when any prior knowledge about the inter-
cept receiver is unavailable. 
The security information optimization strategy can be 
summarized as follows: 
1) Specify the desired MI threshold δth for radar network 
system, which is utilized as a metric for target 
detection performance. 
2) Allocate some transmission power to achieve the de-
sired MI threshold δth for target detection. 
3) Minimize the achievable MI at intercept receiver 
Iint(Pr, Pj) by distributing the remaining transmission 
power to yield as much interference as possible, while 
guaranteeing that the CJ signal is designed to be com-
pletely orthogonal to radar modulating signal and 
generated to jam the intercept receiver without affect-
ing the radar network. 
Hence, the security information optimization for 
enhanced LPID performance can be formulated as: 
 
 
 

int,
max
max
min ,
. .
0,
r j
r jP P
th
net r
r j tot
r r
I P P
s t I P
P P P
P P

           
    (15) 
where Ptotmax is the maximum transmitting power for radar 
network, Prmax is the maximum transmitting power for 
radar modulating signal. While regarding to the complexity 
and uncertainty of electromagnetic environment in the 
modern electronic warfare, the predefined threshold of MI 
at radar network δth would be uncertain. Herein, a fuzzy 
variable δthfuzzy is utilized to evaluate the predefined thresh-
old of MI at radar network. Based on the concepts of credi-
bility theory, the achievable MI outage probability at radar 
network is enforced to be greater than a specified confi-
dence level α, that is: 
   thnet r fuzzyCr I P       (16) 
where Cr{·} indicates the credibility that {·} will occur. 
Therefore, we have the FCCP based security information 
optimization for LPID enhancement in radar network as: 
 
 
  

int,
max
max
min ,
. .
0,
r j
r jP P
th
net r fuzzy
r j tot
r r
I P P
s t Cr I P
P P P
P P

            
   (17) 
With the FCCP model (17), we can observe that in-
creasing the confidence level leads to enlarging the feasible 
set of the true problem, which in turn may result in de-
creasing of the optimal value of the true problem [22]. It is 
also worth pointing out that there exists a restrictive rela-
tionship between the confidence level and the achievable 
MI at intercept receiver. 
3.3 The Crisp Equivalent Form of FCCP 
Model 
The FCCP model (17) is a fuzzy linear programming, 
which can be transformed into the crisp equivalent form. In 
this paper, we set δthfuzzy = (a, b, c, d) (a < b ≤ c < d) to be 
a trapezoidal fuzzy variable. 
Definition 3.1: (Liu, Zhao & Wang [23]) By a trapezoidal 
fuzzy variable, we mean that the fuzzy variable fully 
determined by the quadruplet  1 2 3 4, , ,r r r r  of crisp numbers 
with 1 2 3 4r r r r   , whose membership function is given 
by: 
  
1
1 2
2 1
2 3
4
3 4
3 4
, if
1, if
, if
0, else
x r r x r
r r
r x r
x
x r r x r
r r

                
    (18) 
Definition 3.2: (Liu, Zhao & Wang [23]) The credibility 
distribution of a trapezoidal fuzzy variable  1 2 3 4, , ,r r r r  is: 
  
 
 
1
1
1 2
2 1
2 3
3 4
3 4
4 3
4
0, if
, if
2
1 , if
2
2
, if
2
, if
x r
x r r x r
r r
x r x r
x r r r x r
r r
r x
                         
  (19) 
Theorem 3.1: (Liu [24]) If   is a trapezoidal fuzzy 
number   1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4, , ,r r r r r r r r     , for the given 
confidence level  0.5,1  ,the following equivalent 
transformation can be derived as: 
      1 22 1 2 2Cr x x r r          ,  (20a) 
      3 42 2 2 1Cr x x r r          .  (20b) 
Based on the properties of trapezoidal fuzzy number, 
we have that: 
        2 1 2 1thnet r fuzzy net rCr I P I P c d           
(21) 
The proposed FCCP based security information 
algorithm (17) could be transformed into the following 
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crisp equivalent form: 
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  (22) 
Problem (17) takes radar network mission δthfuzzy into 
consideration because radar network system must accom-
plish its mission in modern battlefield. To be specific, for 
the predetermined system detection probability Pdnet and 
false alarm probability Pfanet, if Cr{Inet(Pr) ≥ δthfuzzy}≥ α and 
Isec(Pr, Pj) > 0, the detection probability of intercept re-
ceiver Pdint would be significantly less than 0.5, which 
means that the interceptor could not intercept and identify 
radar modulating signal, and that the radar network system 
is in completely LPID state [16]. 
Based on the above derivations as (13) and (22), it is 
worth pointing out the simplicity of the proposed algorithm 
which relies on basic mathematical calculations and does 
not require highly complex computation. Moreover, our 
proposed algorithm is significantly simple to implement. 
So far, we have completed the achievable security in-
formation derivation and the FCCP based security informa-
tion optimization for LPID enhancement in radar network 
systems. In what follows, some numerical simulations are 
provided to show the feasibility and effectiveness of our 
presented algorithm. 
4. Numerical Simulations and Analysis 
In this section, we evaluate the proposed algorithm 
through some numerical simulations. Let us consider 
a 4 4  radar network architecture (Nt = Nr = 4), which is 
depicted in Fig. 4 that the netted radars in the network are 
spatially distributed in the surveillance area. 
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Fig. 4. The radar network system configuration in two 
dimensions. 
Herein, we set the simulation parameters 
Ptotmax = Pr + Pj = 25 kW, Gt = Gr = Gj = 30 dB, Gi =0 dB, 
σwr2 = 4.57 × 10–12 W, σwi2 = 8.77 × 10–8 W and σg2 = 1. The 
radar network can detect the target whose RCS is 1 m2 in 
the distance 180 km by transmitting the maximum power 
Prmax = 24 kW. The sensitivity of intercept receiver Si min is 
set to be –80 dBmW. Based on some experimental data, the 
trapezoidal fuzzy number is set to be δthfuzzy = 
(4.4, 8.1, 13.0, 25.6)nats, which equals to the fuzzy SNR 
(7.0, 10.2, 13.0, 18.0) dB. This is because that the radar 
network system can track the target steadily when the SNR 
is between 10.0 dB and 13.0 dB, and the value of the 
membership function is set to be 1. 
4.1 Security Information Analysis 
As shown in Fig. 5, for all the cases Nr = 1, Nr = 2 and 
Nr = 4, with an increasing Nt, the achievable security infor-
mation is increased correspondingly. As the number of 
transmitters Nt continues increasing beyond a certain value, 
the achievable security information of (16) leads to ap-
proximate constant. Fig. 5 also demonstrates that as the 
number of receivers increases from Nr = 1 to Nr = 4, the 
achievable security information for radar network can be 
significantly increased. To be specific, increasing the num-
ber of radars can effectively improve security information 
for radar network. This is because that radar network can 
offer great transmit and receive diversities in terms of the 
achievable security information, which confirms the LPID 
benefits by exploiting radar network system to defend 
against passive intercept receiver attacks. 
Figure 6 shows the achievable security information 
versus Rnet with Pr = 25 kW, Pj = 5 kW and different Rj. It 
can be seen from Fig. 6 that as Rnet and Rj decrease, the 
achievable security information is increased as theoreti-
cally proved in (16). Furthermore, it is depicted that with 
the same Rnet, the available security information can be 
increased as Rj decreases, which shows the advantage of 
exploiting CJ to defend against intercept receiver. 
Figure 7 illustrates achievable MI at intercept receiver 
versus the confidence level   at radar network for differ-
ent sensitivities of intercept receiver Simin with Rnet = 
100 km and Rj = 300 km. In Fig. 7, for all the cases, one 
can observe that the achievable  MI at  intercept  receiver is 
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Fig. 5. Achievable security information versus the number of 
transmitters Nt for different number of receivers Nr 
with Rnet = 150 km, Rj = 250 km, and Pr =Pj =12.5 kW.  
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Fig. 6. Achievable security information versus Rnet with 
Pr =20 kW, Pj =5 kW and different Rj . 
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Fig. 7. Achievable MI at intercept receiver versus the confi-
dence level α at radar network for different sensitivi-
ties of intercept receiver Simin with Rnet = 100 km and 
Rj = 300 km.  
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Fig. 8. Achievable MI at intercept receiver versus Rnet  for 
different confidence levels   and different Rj. 
increased as the confidence level α at radar network in-
creases, which shows that there exists a restrictive relation-
ship between the confidence level α and the achievable MI 
at intercept receiver. This is due to the fact that more radar 
modulating signal would be transmitted to satisfy the 
system requirement with the increase of confidence level at 
radar network. The radar modulating signal could be inter-
cepted by interceptor easily, and the achievable MI at inter-
cept receiver will increase subsequently. Moreover, the 
achievable MI at intercept receiver is reduced as the sensi-
tivity of intercept receiver Simin decreases. 
In Fig. 8, we depict the achievable MI at intercept re-
ceiver versus the distance between radar network and tar-
get Rnet  for different confidence levels at radar network α 
and different distances between radar network and inter-
cept receiver Rj. One can observe from Fig.  that for all the 
cases, the achievable MI at intercept receiver is increased 
as the distance between radar network and target increases 
from Rnet = 5 km to Rnet = 100 km. As mentioned before, 
this is because that more radar modulating signal is trans-
mitted to satisfy the requirement for target detection as Rnet 
increases, so less power is remained to generate CJ signal 
to jam the intercept receiver. Moreover, one can observe 
that as the distance between radar network and intercept 
receiver Rj decreases, the MI at interceptor is reduced, 
showing the LPID performance enhancement of exploiting 
CJ to defend against interceptors in radar network system. 
4.2 Target Tracking with FCCP Based 
Security Information Optimization 
This subsection presents the numerical results of our 
proposed security information optimization scheme in 
target tracking scenario. We track a single target by em-
ploying particle filtering (PF) method. For simplicity, it is 
assumed that the passive intercept receiver is carried by the 
target. Figure 9 shows one realization of the target trajec-
tory for 50 s. Figure 10 illustrates the distance changing 
curve between radar network and target. 
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Fig. 9. Target tracking scenario. 
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Fig. 10. The distance between the radar network and the target. 
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Figure 11 illustrates the achievable MI at intercept re-
ceiver with different confidence levels. We can see from 
Fig. 11 that the achievable MI at intercept receiver is in-
creased as the confidence level increases. This is due to the 
fact that more radar modulating signal will be allocated to 
satisfy the system requirement with the increase of confi-
dence level at radar network, in which way the radar signal 
would be intercepted and identified by hostile interceptor 
easily. It is also worth pointing out that the achievable MI 
at interceptor changes accordingly with the distance be-
tween radar network and target. To be specific, when the 
target is far away from the radar network, the network 
system would allocate more power for modulating signal to 
obtain a better capability of radar network to estimate the 
target. In contrast, as the distance decreases, more power 
for CJ signal could be transmitted to defend against the 
passive intercept receiver, which makes the achievable 
security information robust in terms of LPID performance. 
In Fig. 12, we compare the performance of the pro-
posed FCCP based security information optimization algo-
rithm, the energy-efficiency based algorithm [17] and the 
adaptive security information optimization algorithm [18]. 
The algorithm provided in [17] aims at optimizing the 
energy-efficiency and will terminate to maintain certain 
security information, while the algorithm proposed in [18] 
aims at the optimization of the overall security information 
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Fig. 11. Achievable MI at intercept receiver in the tracking 
process. 
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Fig. 12. Achievable MI at intercept receiver of various 
algorithms. 
by optimizing the transmission power allocation between 
radar modulating signal and CJ signal. As Fig. 12 shows, 
the proposed algorithm significantly outperforms the algo-
rithms proposed in [17] and [18], which is due to the fact 
that the achievable MI at interceptor is remarkable lower 
than that of the compared algorithms across the whole 
region. In addition, the proposed algorithm is more practi-
cal than the algorithm proposed in [18] because of the 
former’s lower complexity. 
4. Conclusions 
This paper has proposed a novel FCCP based security 
information optimization algorithm to achieve improved 
LPID performance in radar network systems without any 
prior knowledge of noncooperative intercept receiver, 
whose purpose is to minimize the achievable MI at inter-
ceptor, while the achievable MI outage probability at radar 
network is enforced to be greater than a specified confi-
dence level. It is worth pointing out that our proposed 
algorithm is presented by simple analytical closed-form 
expression. Simulation results demonstrate that our pro-
posed algorithm is effective to enhance LPID performance 
for radar network to defend against passive interceptor 
attacks. For future research, other optimization criteria 
need to be addressed to improve LPID performance for 
radar network systems. 
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